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ABSTRACT

Community college students (n =353) participated in a
study investigating qualitative and quantitative differences
in

worry as a shared cognitive component of test anxiety

and Generalized Anxiety Disorder.

Moreover, cognitive

coping with stress was examined as a potential moderator of

GAD-like worry.

Participants ranked in the upper 20^''

percentile on a measurement of test anxiety rated

significantly higher than the bottom 80^'^ percentile on a
measure of trait anxiety.

Utilizing Eysenck's

Hypervigilance and Processing Efficiency theories (1992) and
Epstein's construct of Constructive Thinking (1991), it was

hypothesized that high test anxious participants could be
categorized as either GAD-like or high test / trait anxious
(HT/TA) worriers on the basis of DSM-IV GAD diagnostic

criteria.

It was hypothesized that means tests comparing

the GAD and HT/TA worrier groups would reveal that GAD

worriers; would rate significantly higher on measures of

number and breadth of worries, would rate significantly
lower on a measure of cognitive coping with stress, and
would rate significantly higher on measures of social
evaluative concerns.

All hypotheses were confirmed.

Results are interpreted as suggesting that within a

diathesis stress model cognitive coping with stress may
moderate GAD vulnerability.

Future research directions are

discussed.
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TEST ANXIETY AND COPING WITH EVALUATION

Viewed as a response to stress, anxiety represents a

possible reaction to threat detection, threat appraisal, and
apprehension regarding potential outcome (Wells, 1994b).
Research investigating anxiety and anxiety disorders
suggests three measurable factors are central to the

expression of anxiety.

These are referred to as

physiological, cognitive, and behavioral factors.

These

factors are considered as broadly representing observable
responses to an anxiety producing stressor (Barlow, 1988;
Lang, 1971).

Thus, a person's anxious response to a

stressful situation that signals threat may be an increase
in heart rate (physiological), an unwanted preoccupation
with diffuse and worrisome thoughts concerning potential
outcomes and/or future similar anxiety producing situations
(cognitive), and the subsequent avoidance of like situations
based upon the person's expectancies and apprehensions of

the experienced anxiety reoccurring (behavioral).

These

factors are typical of anxious responding to stress observed

in clinical and non-clinical populations (Beck & Emery,
1985).

Daily activities can produce unwanted stress without

producing anxiety.

In this regard, an individual's ability

to adequately cope with life events is related to whether

stress results in anxiety.

It has been shown that coping

with stress contributes to psychological well-being and

overall health (Selye, 1976).

Thus, it is a reasonable

assumption that successful coping serves to moderate the
course of stressed responding in such a way that anxiety may

also be moderated (Dombeck, Siegle, & Ingram, 1996; Lazarus,
1993; Smith, 1996).

For instance, a student facing an exam

may feel stressed over it.

However, stress may elicit that

a competent plan as a form of coping with any perceived

problems in performance.

Studying differences in the

relationship between peopleVs perception of stressful social
situations and attendant anxiety may provide evidence

regarding how the cognitive, behavioral, and physiological
factors of their anxiety are influenced by coping's
moderating effects.

Theorists have emphasized the relationship between
certain affective disorders, such as social phobia and
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), and negatively biased
social perceptions (Borkovec, 1994; Eysenck, 1992).
Specifically, an individual's unrealistic concerns over

behavioral competency and adequate social responding during
social interaction may induce and sustain a stress-related

anxiety component of the disorder (Carver & Scheier, 1988).
These biased perceptions are correlated with a fear of

negative evaluation by others, fear of failure, and

excessive and uncontrollable worry (Barlow & DiNardo, 1991;
Borkovec & inz, 1990; Eysenck, 1992).

Research based on such theories suggests that some

people may automatically process ambiguous social stimuli as

threatening, interfering with otherwise effective coping by
inducing a state of stress tbat elicits anxiety (Borkovec,
Shadick, & Hopkins, 1991).

Individual differences in biased

endogenous threat processing (i.e., dispositional/trait
anxiety) can negatively impact responding in stressful
social situations when a current and otherwise normal

activity is perceived as being susceptible to threatening
social evaluation (Campbell & Fehr, 1990).

Anxiety may then

lead to disruption of task-^fpcus and an evolving perception
that a climate of negative evaluation exists.

For people

who are predisposed to process in this manner, such

perceptions may elicit chronic compensatory patterns of
anxious behavior, thought, and physiologic responding (Olah,
Torestad, & Magnusson, 1989; Ormel & Wholfarth, 1991).
Thus, Under stressful circumstances a coping individual

may be incapable of maintaining adequate levels of taskfocus and performance.

Reduced task performance would

facilitate worry and anxiety that in-'turn would facilitate
the degradation of ongoing respohding across social
situations in-general.

The evolution of an individual's

transient, stress-induced biased processing of threat

stimuli towards Ghronic and maiadaptive anxious-response
themes of social behavior is a component of theoretical

models for vulnerability to, and genesis of, clinical

anxiety disorder (C.F., Beck & Emery, 1985; Eysenck, 1991c;

Gray, 1985;

MacLeod, 1996).

The stressful initiatipn of perseverating, excessive

worry may follow inappropriate resppriding elicited by the
perceived climate of evaluative threat.

The incessant

rumination of negative thoughts then leads to greater worry

and more inappropriate responding resulting in a vicious
cycle exacerbating anxiety and ineffective coping*

Under

these circumstances worry is the principle response-factor
characterizing the experience of anxiety.

When worrying

persists over an ensuing time period of six months, a major

constituent of a clinical GAD diagnosis possibly exists
(Batlow et al., 1986).

Thus, research studying worry as

represehting the increased vulnerability to anxiety is a
necessary pursuit, considering anxiety's debilitating
effects.

Limited-Capacity Threat Processing
As a survival adaptation, threat's rapid detection

ihcreases the likelihood of successfully avoiding harm.

in

their comprehensive review of experimental evidence

concerning the role of attention and anxiety, Williams,
Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews (1988) suggest that the

detection of threat engages both nonconscious (preattentive)

and conscious (focused attention) aspects of cognitive
processing.

As a stimulus is detected, scrutinized, and

subsequently perceived to be threatening, an increase in

arousal occurs.

Under these conditions, arousal is

accompanied by the increased aliocation of cognitive
resources allotted to the threat processing of that stimulus

(C.F., Barlow, 1988; Martin, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993; Shapiro
& Lim, 1989).

Initial stressful stimulus detection may solicit threat
processing without resulting in worry, situational

avoidance, or physiological distress.

Following threat's

detection, but prior to any appropriate responding that may
occur, the context in which the threat-'stimulus is embedded

needs to be evaluated (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).

Gontext

deperident threat processing includes possible stress
reactions, relevant perceptions, and the allocation of
automatic and controlled attentional resources.

Such

processing may be considered adaptive to the extent the

situation is appropriately appraised as a pre-condition to
threat or non-threat respohding.

Therefore, threat

processing can be considered a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for anxiety.

Thus, the continuation of ongoing behavior disregarding
as threatening an indeterminable, ambiguous social stimuli
may represent appropriate responding to initial threat

detection without attendant anxiety.

For example, a

student's perception of missing lecture notes Goncurrent

with stressful anticipation of an upcoming exam may not

elicit uncontrbllable worry cDncerning their test-taking
ability.

In contrast, unable to determine the weighted

importance of the missing information, the student can focus
on existing lecture notes, homevrork, and course readings.

For this student, the processing of ambiguous stimuli
moderates the experience of anxiety and the perception that

exams are a threatening stimuli representing negative
performance evaluation by Others.
Processing Efficiency Theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo,
1992) maintains that some individuals are dispositionally
oriented towards worry as a response to situational stress
that induces anxiety (state-anxiety).

Wdrry requires

cognitive resources that would otherwise be used for the
efficient processing of, and efficient responding to,

important environmental information.

PET assumes that

stressful situations require corresponding increases in

cognitive effort over and above that which is currently
being utilized.

PET postulates that for those people whose

response to stressful situations is worry, the additional
effort compensating for worry's effects only serves to
maintain current levels of performance.

The same effort

provides a performance benefit in the case of the nonworrier.

For example, a worried student may have to

concentrate and re-read an important assigned article to

overcome distracting unwanted thoughts and maintain their
reading-comprehension level.

On the other hand, the same

level of Concentrated re-reading by a non-worried student
would result in a greater depth of comprehension.

It is

assumed that this observed difference occurs due to worry
being maintained by focused attention and lexical rehearsal

in working memory and worry's preemptive utilization of

cognitive resources that would otherwise facilitate the task
at-hand.

PET utilizes a model of working memory that posits
three subsystems (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley St Hitch, 1974).

These subsystems are the executive, the articulatory loop,

and the visio-spatial sketchpad.

The executive (i.e.,

central executive) is primarily involved with the

integration of incoming sensory information With information
in long-term memory and the coordinating of focused
attention mediating stimulus response.

The executive is

also the analog of attention in awareness or consciousness.

The articulatory loop (i.e., phonological loop) serves to
process lexical comprehension.

Another function of this

subsystem is to maintain auditory and lexical information in
memory through rehearsal long enough to be considered by the

executive for storage in long term memory.

The visio

spatial sketchpad represents a visual imagery memory
capacity of limited duration.

This aspect of working memory

is assumed to facilitate mental imagery by maintaining an
analog of visual stimuli during that stimuli's cognitive

processing (e.g., looking at a wall-map while attempting to
visualize and memorize relevant landmarks).
There is evidence supporting PET in recent research on

the effects of worry on working memory.

For instance, in an

experiment requiring the transformation of letters in
forward numeric-dependent alphabetic sequence (i.e., MH + 2
= OJ) by high and low anxious individuals, the high anxious
group had significantly greater response times when compared

to the low anxious group; anxiety affected the performance
of letter transformation associated with increased

processing in the worry-related areas of working memory
(Eysenck, 1985).

Worriers simultaneously utilized existing cognitive
resources and maintained worry.

Cognitive effort did solve

the letter transformation task, but not by the efficient use

of resources in working memory where response-speed is
considered an index of processing efficiency.

The low

anxious group took comparatively less time to complete the
cognitive task.

For them, increased effort contributed to

an increase in efficient problem solving.

High anxious

individuals were unable to redirect working memory towards
problem solving presumably due to its maintenance of anxious

worry.

This inability was evidence of limitations imposed

by this group's restricted capacity of resources.
These results suggest that attentional resources,

otherwise available to the executive for directing focused

attention toward the arena of working memory, were engaged
by the articulatory loop and its lexical processing function
of thought irehearsal presumed to maintain worry.
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In a

review of these experiments, Eysenck (1992) concluded that "
... worry induction produces a shift towards predominance of

... the workings of the articulatory loop ... it would
clearly be useful to have additional information concerning
the processing mechanisms involved in worry" (p.145).
Situational stress and the advent of anxiety are
correlated with perceptual activity, arousal, and levels of
adeguate responding in a performance task (Shapiro, Egerman,

& Klein; 1984).

There is experimental evidence supporting

the assertion that people possess finite cognitive resources

limiting the ability to effectively process information when

conditions are sufficiently stressful (Beck & Emery, 1985;
Darke, 1988; Eysenck, 1985).

The thrust of research in this

area is invested in undei^standing how anxiety loads
additional non-conscious processing demands upon working
memory until effective cognitive appraisal of threat-related
stimuli and adequate response becomes problematic, if not
maladaptive.

Easterbrobk (1959) postulated a relationship between

anxiety, arousal, and attention during task performance.
Arousal significantly attenuates the focus of attention on a
task, thereby narrowing its scope (i.e., cognitive breadth

of attention in awareness).

Thus, in Easberbrook's view a

narrowing of attention that may initially benefit

performance occurs in response to anxiety by limiting the
quaintity of irrelevant information attended to.

However, a

continued increase in arousal may lead to the continued
narrowing of attentional focus.

Subseguently, task-relevant

information previously located within the scope of attention

is peripheralized and not detected.

A narrowing of

attentional focus past the point of effectiveness results
from an arousal factor and arousal's effect on attention.

Easterbrook's hypothesis posits a relatively direct
correspondence between an increase in arousal and the

narrowing of visual attention.

The arousal-attention

process is predicated upon concurrent threat detection and
cognitive appraisal where arousal directs the function of

attention.

The convergence of attention on a detected

threat source following anxious arousal limits the

availability of necessary information—over-focusing

precipitates a decrement in response performance."
There is qualified experimental support for

Easterbrook's hypothesis from studies that suggest
experimental peripheral detection tasks performed during
stress-induced anxiety-arousal states result in narrowed

attention (C.F., Levinson, 1989; Nideffer, 1993).

However,

Eysenck (1992) points out that "When peripheral information

is of as much relevance as central information, then anxiety
seems to be associated with a broad sampling of information"
(p. 54).

In other words, if there is a situational demand

for response where the overall environment is considered

threat-salient, a larger visual sampling of information will
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be attempted, including that on the periphery of vision.

For instance, a person who is presenting a vitally important
project to an unfamiliar group may visually appraise salient

threat stimuli from a broad attentional field.

The person

may automatically, repeatedly and in rapid succession, scan
the room for cues in an unfocused manner—peripherally

noticing facial expressions, furious note-taking> drooping
eyelids, anxious posturing.

This is in contrast to an

equally arousing exam-taking situation where salient threat

can focus the same person's attention upon individual

written items ohe-at-a-time, eliminating other distractions.
Eysenck (1992) suggests that certain aspects of visual

attention help to explain why these alternate and

contrasting scope-of-attention prpcesses may occur.

First,

attention and anxiety affect the visual spotlight (visual
"beam" of attention) conditionally-—depending on the
circumstance, there may be either an enlargement or
contraction in breadth.

Thus, to some extent, vision can be

both broadened to enhance a searching-pattern capable of

locating dispersed threat-related cues and narrowly focused
on a particular area in the environment that is relevant to
responding.

Second, a stimulus once detected is then

identified—if the stimulus is perceived as a threat,
attention is Ipcalized to that point (focused attention).
Third, semantic processing is limited to perceptions in the

center of the field of attention—individuals only ascribe
.■■ ■ • ■11

meaning, through association in memory, to information that
is the focus of their attention in the visual field.

Focused attention is In contrast to a purposeful search of
the environment meant to detect possible sources of stimuli
(attentional search).

The last point distinguishes

interaction between the broadening and narrowing of the

visual beam and the process of focused attention from that
of attentional search (Broadbent, Broadbent, & Jones, 1986).

A finite cognitive resources perspective asspumes that a
limit to what can be effectively processed would necessarily
influence the quantity and quality of information available.
It is likely, from the standpoint of anxiety, that the

relationship between cognitive function and performance
deficits involves the correspondence between a finite

capacity for information processing and ah attentional and

perceptual interaction that impedes effective responding
under stress.

This line of research does not consider that

observed maladaptive performance in the face of a perceived-

threat results from inattentiveness (ignoring information)
or faulty drive processes (fight or flight).

Dysfunctional responding reflects interactions between

a stress-induced state of anxiety and endogenous aspects of

limited cognitive processing capacity, both attentive and
pre-attentive.

The model of working memory, limited

capacity, and coping ability are implicated in a limited

cognitive capacity explanation of anxious responding.
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This

is in contrast to a view that predicts a direct relationship

between arousal and the narrowing of attentional focus, but
does not preclude inattentiveness or faulty drive processes.
Differences exist between processing limitation

perspectives and Easterbrook*s hypothesis.

First,

experimental evidence suggests there are relevant attributes

of working memory that serve to limit information processing
(Baddeley, 1990).

In a recent review of studies

inyestigating GAD, Borkovec (1994) concluded that the
executive and the articUlatory loop overwhelmingly dominate
cognitive resources, maintaining threat as worry in working
memory, at the expense of imaginai processing.

This

suggests that the allocation of processing resources
interactively supports an organizing role of focused

attention.

The implicit variation of responses to threat in

a given situation is more in accord with experimental data
concerning individual differences in threat-related stimulus

perception and responding.

This is in contrast to a direct

relationship between arousal and narrowed attentional focus
dictated by Easterbrook's hypothesis.

Second, a limited resource capacity perspective infers

the a:dvent of worry and intrusive thoughts as a component of
anxiety in working memory.

A negative biasing of ongoing

mentation through selective interpretation of ambiguous
stimuli as threat-related has been shown to impact cognitive
processing (Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 1996).
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In this

regard, MacLeod (1996) states that, " . . . evidence has
accumulated to suggest that it is the worry component of

elevated anxiety, rather than the arousal component, which
is most strongly predictive of impaired cognitive
performance" (p. 48).

Third, limited cognitive resources allow for
situational stress and individual differences in coping

ability to be related in diathesis origin;

The preceding

discussion suggests a correspondence between the degree of
worry, the influence of stress-induced anxiety on the
perception of threat, and the degree to which that threat-

perception intrudes upon an individual's ability to cope
with anxiety.

In other words, when responding to a.

stressful situation with the potential for perceived harm,
biased processing of threat relevant information assumes
primacy in working memory rather than instituting an
automatic arousal concomitant with narrowed attentional

engagement.

It follows that the behavioral, cognitive, and

physiological channels of anxious responding are observable
manifestations of the complex interactions between stress,

anxiety, arousal, and attention co-occurring with cognitive
processing of perceived threat stimuli.

Once again, this is

in contrast to the observable factors of anxiety resulting

from processing primarily dominated by the effects of
arousal on attention.

Furthermore, decreasing arousal alone is not
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necessarily correlated with the successful treatment of

anxiety.

In Some instances (e.g., test anxiety) mitigating

arousal is ineffective (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995).

An

information processing model considers coping with anxiety
as moderating aspects of arousal and other factors that may

otherwise come to dominate information processing (e.g.,
anxiety and attention).

Identifying those attributes of

cognitive coping that moderate worry as a dominant component
of anxiety elicited in response to a perceived evaluative

threat may reveal important information conGerning the
regulation of anxious responding.

If this is the case, the

presence or absence of conditions that are related to
specific coping attributes may contributo to understanding
the presence or absence of vulnerability factors related to

anxious dysfunction.

Individual Differences in Anxiety Related Processing
People's acquired associations between stress in a
social context and perceived threat (e.g., fear of an

impending evaluation in a social setting) may contribute to

an increased sensitivity for anxious responding (Williams et

al., 1988).

The increased propensity for experiencing

stress and anxiety can develop to the point where the demand

for cognitive resources prohibits effective appraisal or
adequate performance in everyday situations that are

innocuous but simila]^ to those in which the original threatassociation was acquired.
■

■

For example, a novice college

15 ; '

student may consider class discussion a frightening
experience due to past associations where providing an
inadequate response in high-school meant an episode of

negative Social evaluation.

In this case, regardless of the

student's preparation or knowledge, actively participating

in class may not be forthcoming due to worry elicited by the
avSrsive effects of anxiety upon retrieval of the right
thing to S^y*

Individuals susceptible to a stress-^induced

bias for prpcessing ambiguous social situations as

evaluative threat may inadvertently increase their
likelihood to engage in anxiety-^related processing in
particular, at the expense of accurate perception and taskrelevant behavior (Eysenck, 1992).

Within the context of perceptions and cognitions of
threat-related stimuli, Eysenck (1991b) has proposed a

hypervigilance theory (HT).

HT assumes that cognitive

processes relevant to threat detection are evolutionarily
adaptive.

Thus, hypervigilance is related to a normal

endogenous cognitive function that executes a rapid

orientation of automatic perceptual processing supported by
the re-allocation of attentional resources from competing
neutral stimuli to signals of threat (Gray, 1985).

HT

places the automatic focusing of attention on threat in the
context of a characteristic innate cognitive feature of

attention essential to survival.

This aspect of attention

facilitates appropriate and functional cognitive channels

16

for threat's rapid detection.
It follows that attentional bias towards threat

processing is subject to individual variation.

According to

HT, a cognitive bias for over-processing threat represents
an increased affectability of systems that are otherwise

evolutionarily adaptive.

Therefore, in an otherwise

functional non-clinical population, anxiety disorder may
originate with the over-processing of both threat-related
and ambiguous situations as those that precede harm.

It is

on the basis of these assumptions that HT predicts

differences of pre-attentive and attentional cognitive

functioning between individuals who possess a temperamental
predisposition towards higher levels of anxiety and those
not so temperamentally predisposed—referred to in HT as
high trait-anxious and low trait-anxious individuals

respectively.

Furthermore, HT posits a relationship between

high dispositional trait-anxiety (HDTA) and anxiety
disorder.

These individuals represent a population

characterized by an endogenous proclivity to regularly overprocess task irrelevant ambiguous stimuli as threat-related.

The limited amount of cognitive resources that remain when

in an increased state of stress is inadequate for normal

functioning.

Thus, these individuals may have an overall

lower threshold of susceptibiility to anxiety, worry, and
anxiety disorder.

17

Research on Hypervigilance

Hypervigilance is an individual difference in
perception processing that can be directly related to
anxiety (Eysenck, 1992).

HDTA individuals may manifest

hypervigilance in several ways.

There may be a noticeable

inclination towards automatically processing information
that is irrelevaht to the task-at-hand.

This amounts to

distractibility, characterized by mind-wandering and the
inability to sustain focused attention on necessary taskrelated functioning.

Visual scanning may also present

itself with quick eye movements seeking out threat-related

stimuli that, once located, may elicit subsequent eyefixation.

There may be biased or selective attention

towards threat-related rather than threat-neutral Stimuli;

attention is repeatedly directed towards stimuli in the
immediate environment that is possibly, but not necessarily,
related to harm.

An additional quality that may be present

is the broadening of attention prior to detecting and

processing the salience of threat related stimuli, followed

by a narrowing of attention during threat processing.

This

corresponds to the narrowing and widening of the visual beam
of focused attention that facilitates the detection of

threat-related stimuli and subsequent allocation of

processing resources directing a threat response.

The interactive quality of anxiety in the presence of
stressful situations has led researchers to investigate the

18

role of HDTA and state anxiety components in the etiology of

anxiety disorder—both are implicated in the development of
anxiety related dysfunction.

It is important to clearly

emphasize that dispositional (trait) and state anxiety are
conceptually distinct.

Trait anxiety has been characterized

as temporally stable and dispositional (endogenous).

In

contrast, state anxiety is generally regarded as teitiporally
transient and situationally defined (exogenous).

Eysenck (1992) has suggested that the distinctibn
between trait and state resembles what Ryle (1949) has
termed "disposition and occurrence.

Disposition is an

attribute given in consideration of predictable responses
that are cohsistently evident across time under identifiable
conditions.

In contrast, an occurrence is an observed

response isolated in time and frequency as a single event.

In this sense negative responding to testihg as evaluative

questioning is consistent with disposition whereas worry
focused upon the grade is preoccupation with a specific
result or occurrence.

In acpprdance with the separateness of disposition and
state, research on HT has focused on CQmparisons of task
performance under conditions of cognitive demand.

HT

research typically employs participants from functional

populations rated high and low on dispositional anxiety,

clinically disordered populations, and successfully
recovered anxious populations.
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In this regard, Eysenck has

suggested that experimental data on HT reveals a

relationship between Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and
the HDTA individual.

GAD is a diagnosable DSM-IV anxiety disorder.

It is a

defining characteristib of individuals who are diagnosed

GAD-positive to manifest " ... an intensity, duration, or
frequency of... anxiety and worry [that] is far out of

proportion to the actual likelihood or impact of the feared
event.

The person finds it difficult to keep worrisome

thoughts from interfering with attention to tasks at hand

and has difficulty stopping the worry" (DSM-IV, 1994; p;
443).

A central component of GAD is a systematic bias in the

interpretation and subsequent processing of irrelevant,
ambiguous stimuli as threatening.

HT assumes that this bias

is a non-normal cognitive function related to the presence
of hypervigilance in HDTA individuals.

Eysenck (1991) has found support for HT in a series of

studies investigating cognitive vulnerability to GAD.

His

assessment is principally concerned with discriminating
between two hypothesized forms of cognitive vulnerability to
GAD that may be present in HDTA individuals.

One possible

form, termed "manifest vulnerability," represents a low-

level of constant and chronic vulnerability to anxiety

disorder that exists regardless of state anxiety or stress.

The second possible form is termed "latent vulnerability."
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Latent vulnerability represents a threshold for clinically
anxious dysfunction that is significantly lowered for HDTA

individuals when compared to non-HDTA individuals in certain
situations.

The dysfunctional condition only emerges in the

presence of stress-induced anxiety state anxiety, indicating
that latent vulnerability is stressed-state dependent.
HT research paradigms measure differences between the

anxiety-related cognitive functioning present in groups of
HDTA individuals, low dispositionally anxious normal
controls, currently diagnosed clinically GAD individuals,
and recovered post-morbid GAD individuals.

If a state-

anxiety-independent manifest vulnerability factor exists for
GAD, cognitive-related task-performance in unstressed HDTA

individuals should more closely resemble GAD populations
When compared to normal controls or recovered GAD

populations.

On the other hand, if HDTA individuals more

closely resemble normal controls until a stress-induced

state of anxiety occurs, at which time their cognitive
functioning is relatively comparable to that of GAD
populations, then support would be found for a latent
vulnerability factor.

Consistent with a diathesis-stress

model, Eysenck's research suggests that hypervigilant HDTA

individuals in methodologically appropriate stressful

situations are representative of a latent vulnerability to
GAD.

Additional research has implicated the presence of
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hypervigilance in HDTA individuals,

in an important

illustration of the distractibility component of HT,
Mathews. May, Mogg, and Eysenck (1990), manipulated the

awareness of location for a target stimulus presented with
either neutral or threat-related destructors.

In their

study, Mathews et al. utilized groups Of GAD recovered and
currently diagnosed individuals in addition to normals.

Two

experiments analyzed differences between groups on the speed
of stimulus detection when neutral letters or words were

presented as stimulus targets in the presence of various
destractors.

In the first experiment, the neutral letter target Was
detected on-screen, in the presence of a number termed a

destructor digit.

These targets were not processed

significantly different by any of the three groups when
compared to one another.

In the second experiment neutral

words were used as targets, and threatening or non

threatening words were presented simultaneously as
destructors.

When compared to normals, the recovered and

currently GAD diagnosed groups showed significantly greater
latency (slower detection speed) in locating the target,
across cued (a dot indicating the target's forthcoming
location) and uncued (no indication) conditions in the
presence of destructors.

In the absence of destructors

there were no significant differences between groups;
distraction rather than orienting cues affected the anxious
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groups.

A comparative analyses of the three groups concerning

distraction effects (using either threatening or non
threatening destructors) on uncued trials revealed that when

non-threat destructors were presented, the pattern of

effects in the normal and recovered groups resembled each
other.

This suggests that GAD recovered individuals and

normals locate and process words in the presence of nonthreat distraction equally well; distraction in and of
itself was not a factor.

This was in contrast to the threat

word destructor condition where recovered GAD individuals

resembled the currently diagnosed GAD individuals while

neither resembled the normal controls.

Although capable of

processing in the presence of distraction per-se, the
qualitative nature of the distraction affected recovered GAD

individuals, with threat words demanding an increase in
cognitive processing.

Similar support for hypervigilance as a component of
dispositional anxiety and its relationship to GAD comes from
experimental investigations of selective processing (for a

discussion, see Eysenck, 1991a).

Mogg, Mathews, and Eysenck

(1992) compared GAD, GAD recovered, and normal control

groups with each other on the selective allocation of

attention towards threat related and neutral words presented
in paired sequence.

The first word in the presentation

sequence was a prime eliciting the activation of semantic
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associations in memory.

Immediately following the prime,

the paired neutral or threat-related target-word appeared

and was vocally identified by the participartt.

A reduction

in the time taken to identify the target-word was assumed to
indicate that a facilitation of attentional responding had
occurred due to the semantic association with the antecedent

prime-word present in memory.
As predicted, the normals showed no difference in the

allocation of attention when comparing threat-related to
neutral target word-naming response times.

However, the GAD

diagnosed individuals showed a significant attentional bias
towards threat-related target words over neutral words.
This was indicated by the relative increase in speed with
which the naming of threat-related words took place.

These

and other experimental findings suggest that hypervigilance
is a substantive element contributing to dispositional
anxiety (for a discussion, see Eysenck, 1992).
Current research investigating HT is focused on

determining if predicted elements in high trait anxious

individuals are at work in the postulated relationship
between biased threat processing and the latent

vulnerability to GAD.

Eysenck (1992) has concluded that

fear of evaluation occurring in a social setting may be

implicated as one such element.

Importantly, he states, that

the biased processing of ambiguous stimuli as threat-related
may create " ... unrealistic social-evaluative worries"
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(p.162) that are excessive and uncontrollable.

The

selection of a social environment where state-anxious and

trait anxious individuals are routinely evaluated would
complement an investigation of possible relationships

between the fear of evaluation, worry, and stress-induced
anxious dysfunction representing a latent vulnerability
factor to GAD.
a population.

College students with test anxiety are such
The worry and fear of evaluation in test

anxiety corresponds to those elements of anxiety and threat
that EySenck has suggested affects the relationship between

endogenous biased threat processing and latent vulnerability
(Flett & Blankstein, 1994).
HT, Test Anxiety, and Latent Vulnerability to GAD

College students represent an adult population in which
testing, as a social evaluative experience, is a common

source of stress.

Test anxiety may be viewed as a specific

category of social-evaluation anxiety occurring in this non
clinical, and so, generally functional population (for a
discussion, see Krohne, 1992).

Test anxiety is defined as

the maladaptive and anxious response to the stressful

evaluative experience of testing concomitant with a

persistent preoccupation with possible failure (Sears &
Milburn, 1990).

Furthermore a central feature in test

anxiety in excessive and intrusive rumihative thoughts
concerning negative evaluation (Carver & Scheier, 1989).

Studies (e.g.. Sears & Milburn, 1990) have shown that
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test anxious individuals• attentional focus is cdnstrained

during test taking by a fear of failure due to their selfperceived lack of behavioral competency when subjected to

evaluation; in test anxiety the test is cognitively overprocessed as a perceived threat stimulus that elicits a fear
of negative evaluation and anxious worry concerning poor

performance.

Fear of negative evaluation is a distressed

and anxious preoccupation with others* perceptions of the
individual * s failure to adequately perform in accordance
with social norms.

The test-anxious individual is

threatened and worried by sustained, unwanted, and intrusive
thoughts related to perceptions that suggest an inadequate

test performance may lead to a form of social rejection and
social censorship by others.
During test-taking, the test anxious student exhibits
the three factors generally found in anxious responding.

Thus, there may be present the worries, actions, and
sensations characteristic of the behavioral, physiological,

and cognitive response channels observed in anxious
individuals.

For example, test anxious individuals may

simultaneously act to behaviorally subvert their doing well
on the day of the test by showing up late (behavioral;
Murray & Warden, 1992), expect to suffer from moments of
physiological distress such as heart palpitation, sweating,
dizziness (physiological; Reiss, 1991), regard the test as

linked to an ever-expanding cycle of failure in general

•
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(worry; Flett & Blankstein, 1994), and experience an

inability to sustain task-related mental focus (cognitive
interference; Sarason, 1984).
Research suggests that fear of evaluation in test

anxiety is consistent with the fear of negative social
evaluation (FNSE) component observed in GAD (C.F., Edwards &

Trimble, 1992; Endler, Parker, Bagby, & Cox, 1991).
Furthermore, in both test anxiety and GAD, worry as the

cognitive component of anxiety is most representative of an
individual's threat processing and responding.

Thus,

corresponding differences between the worry these two groups
have may reflect differences in aspects of the stress they
experience (e.g., school vs. work, class discussion vs.
public speaking).

It follows that characteristic attributes

of worry that differ between test anxiety and GAD may
somehow represent separable processing characteristics

affecting dysfunction across differing stressful situations.
In the academic environment, where the organized and

ritualized regimen of higher education culminates in
evaluation by a familiar and standardized form of testing,
anxious responding may be isolated in narrow areas, such as
a fear of tests and worry about grades.
However, the scholastic expression of social-evaluative

fear may contrast with its expression in a relatively

spontaneous everyday social environment.

For example,

unlike the student facing a test, a trait anxious sales
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person extemporaneously speaking at a out-of-town meeting
may be the object of intense evaluative scrutiny.

If this

stressful evaluative experience leads to anxiety and an

inadequate performance, it seems improbable that a

corresponding fear of the meeting's topic would become the
focus of worried thought.

Rather, an increased occurrence

of broad and diffuse worry about stressful evaluative
responding in-general seems more likely.

This is in accord

with HT's perspective in that biased processing of ambiguous
social stimuli as threat-related may meaningfully contribute
to increased unrealistic worry.

Thus, an initial stressful

social interaction that increases the awareness and fear of

possible negative evaluation may initiate or contribute to

chronic, broad, excessive, uncontrollable worry of a kind
that characterizes GAD.

Learning the process of learning how to be successful
in evaluative situations is one job of institutionalized
education.

In this regard, the scholastic environment's

function is to inculcate coping strategies as a means of

meta-enabling the student.

Importantly, the material to be

learned is presented in a manner appropriate for an
unambiguous and clearly stated evaluative objective achieved

through formal testing.

The effect of this learning may

transform the HDTA student's perception of evaluative threat

in-general into a fear of test taking in-particular.

HDTA

anxious students with high levels of test anxiety may be
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representative of endogenous biased threat processing.
However, the disordered expression of this bias threat as

GAD, may be moderated by the structured, routinized,
educational environment with its relatively effective and

concerned population of accessible peers, scholars, and
administrators.

The explicit rules and the implicit routines of a

university-domihated lifestyle impose an organized
structuring of behavior.

The enforced doctrines of

matriculation and the repeated, unavoidable, systematic
exposure to a disambiguating learning environment may

increase some HDTA student's overall coping proficiency.
This seems reasonable as the academic environment is

ostensibly formulated to orient the focus of attention

toward situationally relevant social stimuli in a non

threatening and unambiguous way in order to preclude

unwanted distraction.

In part, academia may inadvertently

increase cognitive functioning in some HDTA students by
environmentally suspending the proclivity for biased threatprocessing and anxiety-driven global worry.

What remains as

a residual is the stress-induced test anxiety.

For these

students, test taking is the academic equivalent to a

stressful social situation where hypervigilance biases

cognitive processing and inadequate coping with negative
evaluation and failure perpetuates a degradation of taskperformance.
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The test anxious student's adaptive responses to the
systematic training of academic discipline may direct
attention away from non-scholastic evaluative concerns that

might otherwise sustain an evolution towards severe global
dysfunction (Endler, Kantpr, & Parker, 1994).

Spielberger

and Vagg (1987) have noted that test-anxiety treatment
programs rely upon a predictable traditional Mucational

setting to help inculcate effective coping strategies.

These programs utilize group discussion, skills training,
and focused cognitive processing directing effort towards
overcoming evaluative concerns.

The intent is to

... help students to organize and structure their

activities in test situations, thus contributing indirectly
to improved test-taking skills"

(Spielberger & Vagg, 1987;

p. 182).

In comparison with a university context, everyday

social evaluation may be subject to a lesser degree of
environmental moderation.

For instance, a job interviewer

might challenge an HDTA job candidate with a fear of

negative social evaluation to make an impromptu presentation
of an imaginary product line.

In this and similar

instances, environmental structure is problematic, and

occurrence of disordered anxious cognitive, behavioral, and

physiological responding that perseveres across time may be
more likely.

If a latent vulnerability factor exists, the

lack of structure and learning may contribute to the
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OGCurrence of chronic worrying characteristic of GAD (Carver
& Scheier, 1989).
Under stressful state-anxious evaluative conditions,
the test anxious HDTA student exhibits all three of the

factors of anxious responding.

However, the most operative

dysfunctional factor is the cognitive element of worry.
Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that the test anxious

individuals' fear of evaluation is closely tied to a
corresponding social evaluative fear present in GAD
diagnosed individuals (Edwards & Trimble, 1992; Endler,

Parker, Bagby, & Cox, 1991).

HT, PET, and the speculated

latent vulnerability to GAD present in certain trait anxious
individuals, suggest that the fear of negative evaluation
component in test anxiety is related to the FNSE component
in GAD and social phobias.

Thus, some students with test-

anxiety may represent socially anxious, but coping, trait
anxious individuals with a moderated vulnerability to GAD.
In consideration of this possibility, related questions

emerge.

For instance, is a GAD evaluative worry component

present in some test anxious HDTA college students but not
others?

Do some test anxious individuals quantitatively

differ in worried-thought occurrence and worry-arena breadth
from others?

In addition, do they differ in how diffuse

their worried ruminative thoughts are-—a qualitative aspect
of their worry?

Do differences in the quantitative and

qualitative aspects of worry correspond with differing
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degrees of general coping ability in test anxious HDTA
college students?

Social Threatf cognitive Coping^ and GAD
The current discussion takes the perspective that

stress-induced, state anxiety elicits the biased processing

of ambiguous social stimuli as evaluative threat initiating
uncontrollable anxious worry in some HDTA individuals.

In

response to the demands of stress, working memory's

executive control attempts to allocate additional cognitive
resources.

Some HDTA individuals have no excess resources

available and cannot shift utilized resources to the

executive control, presumably due to the maintenance of on

going worry in the articulatory loop of working memory.
Thus, an important quality of HDTA individuals is that worry
limits the degree to which perceptions of threat can be

efficiently regulated.

Under stress, increased cognitive

effort may cope with additional demands from the executive

control, although effort does not increase the efficiency of

responding as much as maintain existing performance levels.
It is reasonable to assume that if the HDTA

individual's cognitive efforts successfully cope with

situational response—demands, decreasing stress may occur.
However, threat-processing is regulated outside of awareness

and not directly moderated by increased cognitive effort.
The HDTA individual's negative cognitive bias works against
effortful coping and overloads working memory systems.
■■
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This

can lead to a global state of anxious arousal producing

intrusive and uncontrollable worrisome ruminations (lexical

processing) that serve to facilitate gross misperceptions
and misrepresentations in consciousness while decreasing the
probability of adequate social responding.

What responding

does occur is a warding-off of threat in the guise of
socially unacceptable and inept conduct (defensiveness
possibly concomitant with avoidance).

The implied

circularity of negative interpersonal responding has been a
contributing pre-morbid factor in the case histories of GAD

(Vitkus, 1996).

A specific category of social interactions may be

intensely stressful to an HDTA individual (e.g., speaking
with authority figures, interacting with the opposite sex).
According to the theoretical perspective taken by this
study, circumstances that elicit corresponding anxious
arousal also increase the probability for automatic
interpretation of irrelevant/ambiguous stimuli as threat and
subsequent threat responding as one or all of the observable
anxiety response channels—-cognitive, behavioral, and
physiological factors.

It is reasonable to assume that

experiencing a spiraling incline in the frequency of and

intensity of stressful situations may contribute to higher
levels of global stress.

Thus, an overall increase in the

frequency of anxiety provoking situations may lead to a
lengthening in duration of event related stressed-states and
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heightened perceived presence or salience of event related
evaluative threat.

Given the above, it seems unlikely that the HDTA
individual would respond to fewer and fewer situations with

worry.

Rather, a generalization of perceptions of

evaluative threat and ambiguity would seem to be indicated.
Thus, over time the HDTA individual may develop a
circularity of anxious dysfunction that generalizes to a

broader variety of recurring situations, increasing the
probability that uncontrollable worry will be a consistent
element present during many different social interactions
across many life-domains.

Furthermore, there may be an

acquired susceptibility to engage in threat processing.
This is made more probable given the reasonable assumption
that most social interaction requires a tacitly understood
and shared context that abridges ambiguity in communication.
However, under stressed circumstances, ambiguity may
nevertheless prevail.

Consider the perceptiohs of an HDTA student attemptihg

to add an important class.

The shared context between

themselves and a professor who might add them may be

disparate, due to the student's automatic bias for threat

processing.

The resulting ambiguity could obscure the

perception of inforffiiation relevant to efficient interaction
between the student and the class instructor.

if a

stressful professor/student interaction ensues, the already
'

^
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stressed HDTA student•s anxiety and worry may escalate past
the point of effortful coping, with simultaneous maintenance
of adequate task performance becoming problematic.

Under

these circumstances, the student might not be able to re
focus adequate attention upon relevant disambiguating
information; despite either person's intent, the student's

task-disoriented processing could become a string of
defensive, poorly conceived responses.

The student's

ability to direct the conversation towards a satisfactory
conclusion at that point would be unlikely.

The student's

failure to successfully petition might contribute to

sustaining the now-decreased threshold for global anxious
social responding under induced stress.

Eysenck (1992) postulates a relationship between coping

strategies and vulnerability to clinical anxiety, stating
that "inter-individual" social evaluative cognitions
comprise the preponderance of worried thought-content in
HDTA individuals.

The preceding scenario describes a

fictional circumstance that is supported by evidence from
many different related lines of experimental inquiry cited
by Eysenck.

Related research includes studies on self-

confirmatory evidence seeking by individuals in social

situations (Swann, 1987), HDTA negative self-perceptions
(Endler et al., 1996), and HDTA individuals' inappropriate

social behavior inducing situational stress (Campbell &
Rushton, 1978; Ormel & Wolfarth, 1991).
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Hypotheses

Utilizing Eysenck's theoretical framework as meaningful

empirically driven constructs with explanatory power
concerning the development of worry in GAD, the current

study posits specific relationships concerning trait
anxiety, test anxiety, and GAD.
Research suggests that trait anxiety and test anxiety

are characterized by the biased cognitive processing of
threat, eliciting worry as the cognitive component of
anxious responding (Eyesenck, 1992).

Therefore, individuals

with high measures of test anxiety should also be trait

anxious.

These individuals would represent both high trait

anxiety and high test anxiety.

Studies of clinically diagnosed GAD populations that
have Used non—clinical trait anxious populations as a

comparison group report a significant correlation between

trait anxious worry, as a response to evaluative threat, and
worry in GAD.

These and other studies report that

uncontrollable diffuse worry across many life areas, a key
feature existing in pre-morbid and currently morbid GAD

populations, pervades the mentation of situationally
stressed trait anxious individuals.

Both experimental and

correlational investigations of GAD utilize the similarly
reported characteristics of trait anxious worry as the

response compohent most representative of the disorder (for

discussion see|Eysenck, 1992). As a result, among high test
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anxious-high tr^it anxious individuals, differing
qualitative and quantitative aspects of worry as the
cognitive component of anxious threat responding to
evaluation should not be distinguishable.

Heretofore, studies exploring a relationship between
trait anxiety and GAD have assessed differences in

maladaptive responding to stressful situations and not
comparative differences between the nature of anxious

worried thoughtfs.

These findings suggest that excessive

worry in high trait anxious test anxiety should be self-

rated as diffuse across mahy domains, representing HT and
pet's conceptualization of the general endogenous propensity
for inaladaptive biased cognitive over-processing of
evaluative threat shared by trait anxious individuals and

those with GADi

Individuals who exhibit comparatively

narrow and fewi worry domains concomitant with stress, would

be uncharacteristic of GAD's worry component, regardless of
their degree olf trait anxiety.

This distinction indicates

that number of; worries, worry breadth, and worry domains are

relevant to dijfferences in threat perception and subsequent
processing within a specific anxious population.
i

Current rjesearch (Flett & Blankstein, 1994) suggests
that for trait anxious students, testing should be one of

many excessive worry-producing situations—-in this case,
worry as a threat-response to the task of successfully

completing a scholastic evaluation.
.
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Based on this
'
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assumption worry in test anxiety, as a channel of their
anxious responding, should conform to a number of the

currently defined attributes of worry observed in high trait
■

!

■ ■ ■

■

■

anxious individuals in general.

Furthermor^, within the theoretical framework of
Eysenck's HT and PET, these shared attributes of worry are

empirically related to the expression of GAD in clinically
diagnosed persons (Borkovec & Inz, 1990).

As such, trait

anxiety, test a|nxiety, and measures of GAD worry should
possess a basig relationship and similar cohesive structure

of diffuse ruminative thoughts.

These thoughts should be

measurable as Excessive and uncontrollable worry on reliable
self-report assessment instruments.

In trait anxious

individuals, it is assumed that it is uncharacteristic for
worry to be about narrowly focused concerns, but rather

characterized by diffuse perseverating and intrusive

thoughts acros^ many areas of personal experience.
This study suggests that a careful investigation of the
relationship between the nature of worry in test anxious

individuals and the nature of worry as indicative of
possible GAD vulnerability is warranted.

In the case of

trait anxious students who have test anxiety but do not cope

well, latent vulnerability to GAD may be characterized by
worrisome, intrusive GAD-like thoughts.
i

'

'•■

The GAD vulnerable
■

'

student's worrying reflects the unmitigated incursion of
i

■■
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'
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'

threat-related! evaluation fear structures as worry
■
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maintained in working memory primed by the perceived threat

of ijnpending social evaluation-—including test-taking.

It

is assumed these students would have worrisome thoughts that

are both global in nature and span across many life domains

Compared to trait anxious individuals assessed as having
test-anxiety concomitant with the ability to cope.

Thus,

coping test-anxious individuals will self-report principally
narrow worry in fewer domains (e.g., academic worry
concerning grades) and will not represent a latent

vulnerability to GAD^
Thus, hypervigilaht trait anxious individuals with a

latent vulnerability to GAD should report significantly more

diffusion and breadth of worry across many worry domains
when compared to those whose higher ratings on measures of
GAD worry (e.g., Penn State Worry Questionnaire, PSWQ;

Meyer, Miller Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) reflect a GAD-

correlated, high level of global anxious responding.
Furthermore, hypervigilant trait anxious individuals should

also score higher on domains of worry measures (e.g.,

Anxious Thoughts Inventory, AnTI; Wells, 1994a) revealing a

significantly broader arena of concerns (unfocused breadth),
when contrasted with coping individuals representing

significantly fewer and more context-specific concerns as
evaluative threat—-such as an upcoming test.
An anxiety-moderating influence that may be

representative of the coping skills referred to by Eysenck
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(1992) and further developed in the current study, is

meaningfully represented by the construct of "Constructive

Thinking" (Epstein, 1990) and measured by Epstein's
Constructive Thinking Inventory (CTI: Epstein & Meier,
1989).

In their recent study employing the CTI, Epstein and

Katz (1992) point out that "Constructive thinking is defined
as the ability to solve problems in everyday life at a

minimum cost in stress" (p. 813).

The CTI has one global

coping factor along with six reliable sub-factors; Emotional
Coping, Behavioral Coping, Categorical Thinking, Personal

Superstitions Thinking, Esoteric Thinking, and Naive
Optimism.

The global coping factor and six sub-factors

assess a general coping ability, not how individuals deal
with stress.

The CTI should distinguish between dispositionally
trait anxious individuals who have acquired a general
ability to cope while in college, but do not do well on
tests, and those whose broader dimension of worry persists

in the absence of this ability.

Importantly, the

relationship between the CTI and a latent vulnerability to
GAD is hypothesized as a characteristic of cognitively
coping with the demands of scholarship and responding to

relatively ambiguous stimuli without subsequent anxious
arousal.

This study's hypothesized theoretical relationship
between the structured academic learning environment's
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Gapacity to produce a global coping ability as measured by
the CTl and a moderation of trait anxious worry in general,

is relevant to its investigation of Eysenck's GAD latent

vulnerability factor.

This theoretical relationship is the

central component of the investigation's general exploratory
and descriptive element involving the possible mitigating

effects of coping with anxious responding when worry is
considered the cognitive element of anxiety.

However no

mechanism tying individual differences in the scope and
nature of trait anxious worry to that moderation is

considered.

It is likely that the inclusion of this general

exploratory and descriptive element will result in valuable

collaborative support by providing information resulting
from data generated through concurrent CTI measurement.

This contribution is well within the purview of the
theoretical models employed in this discussion of
vulnerability to GAD.

By integrating the possible relationship between coping
and Eysenck's latent vulnerability to GAD, this study seeks
to establish the importance of considering the breadth of

worry in test anxious college populations within this
context.

Specifically, there should be significant

differences in social responding.

Furthermore, these

differences should relate to differences in cognitive
coping, measurable with the CTI: high trait anxious test

anxious individuals rating high on Constructive Thinking and
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rate low on the DSM-ADIS measures of global worry should

rate significantly lower on measures of social phobia and
the FNE compared to trait anxious test anxious individuals

rating low on Constructive Thinking and rating high on the
ADIS-DSMIV measures of global worry. These findings would
represent initial support for Eysenck's conclusion that

intrasocial elements can be linked to GAD vulnerability
through predictions generated by Hypervigilance Theory and

Processing Efficiency Theory.
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METHOD

Participants

The study's participant pool (11= 353) was from a

southern California community college student population
enrolled in regular classes scheduled during a normal
academic-year semester.

Participant's characteristics

concerning anxiety were unselected.

The mean age of those 352 participants reporting age
was 23 years.

Of those reporting gender (11= 352); 214

(61%) were women and 138 (39%) were men, with 1 case

missing.

For those reporting annual income (n = 335); 219

(57.3%) were under $10,000, 40 (11.3%) were between $10,001

and $15,000, 18 (5.1%) were between $15,001 and $20,000, 17
(4.8%) were between $20,001 and $25,000, 4 (l.l%)were
between $25,001 and $30,000, 10 were (2.8%) were between

$30,001 and $35,000, 7 (2.0%) were between $35,001 and

$45,000, 20 (5.7%) were above $45,000, with 18 (5.1%)
missing.

Of those reporting race (n = 349); 200 (56.7%)

were Caucasian (or White), 78 (22.1%) were Hispanic, 33

(9.3%) were African American (or Black), 25 (7.1%) were

Asian (or Asian American), 3 (0.8%) were Native American (or
American Indian), 10 (2.8%) were Other, with 4 (1.1%)
missing.
Procedure

Survey packets were distributed in class during normal
class hours following a brief presentation to familiarize
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the partiGipants with the packet's self-report Likert-type
scales and printed instructions.

It was assumed that

assessment of test-anxiety as well as other anxiety-related

constructs by self-report would have enhanced reliability if
testing were a salient attribute of the participant's
environment.

As a result, all surveys were distributed

during a class session taking place 3 to 7 days before an
examination scheduled for that class.

All testing was

regularly scheduled on the class syllabus.

All participants

were given extra credit for the instrument packet•s

completion.

The amount of extra credit was determined in

advance of and was uniform across survey-data collection.
Dependent Measures

Anxious Thoughts Inventory (AnTI; Wells, 1994a).

The

AnTI is a 22 item, five point (1-5) Likert-type scale
designed to assess worry in three domains; social worry,
health worry, and meta-worry (defined as conscious concern

over worry).

Wells (1994a) reports the scale as having good

internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .80).

Constructive Thinking Inventory Short Form (CTI-S;
Epstein & Meier, 1989).
The CTI-S is a 52 item, five point (1-5) Likert-type
scale designed to assess global coping ability^

Published

1994 norms indicate good internal consistency (Cronbach's
alpha = .80).
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Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Questionnaire (BFNE;
Watson & Friend, 1969).

The BFNE is a 12 item, 5 point (1-5) Likert-type scale
designed to assess threat-related fear/anxiety responding in
evaluative social situations, with scores ranging from 0 to

30; higher scores indicating greater perceived social-

evaluative threat.

The scale is reported as having good

internal consistency (KR-20 = .94) (Corcoran & Fischer,
1987).

Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS; Watson &

Friend, 1969).
The SADS is a 28 item true-false inventory designed to
assess the avoiding of social situations due to the anxious

and fearful distress experienced in those situations, with

scores ranging from 0 to 28; higher scores indicating
greater anxious avoidance and social distress.

The scale is

reported by Corcoran and Fischer (1987) as having excellent
internal consistency (Formula KR-20 = .94).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory - Form Y (STAI Form Y-1 &
STAI Form Y-2); Spielberger, 1983).

The STAI Form Y-1 (state) and the STAI Form Y-2 (trait)
anxiety inventories are 20 item, four point (1-4), Likert

type scales.

Form Y-1 is designed to assess the situation

and time specific elements of anxiety—referred to as state
anxiety.

Form Y-2 is designed to assess enduring

dispositional anxiety-proneness—referred to as trait
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anxiety.

Scores for the iScales rahg$ froim 26 to 80 with

higher scores indicating greater perceived anxiety.
Spielberger (1983) reports excellent reliability for both

prorii Y-1 (Crdnbaeh's alpha

•925) and {Fbrm y-2 (Crdnbach's

alpha = .905).

Penn State Worry Questionnaire

(PSWQ; Meyer, Miller,

Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990).

The PSWQ is a 16 item, five point (1-5) Likert-type
scale designed to assess worry as a component of experienced
anxiety.

Scores range from 16 to 80 with higher scores

indicating greater perceived anxious worry.

The PSWQ has

excellent reliability with Cronbach alphas in the 90s
(Paulhus, 1987).

Test Attitude Inventory

(TAI; Spielberger, Gonzalez,

Taylor, Algaze, & Anton, 1978).

The TAI is a 20 item, four point (1-4) Likert-type
scale designed to assess test-anxiety.

Scores range from 20

to 80 with higher scores indicating greater test-anxiety.
The TAI has reported KR-20 reliability alphas of .92.
Social Phobia and GAD Self Report APIS-TV

This scale was developed by Mettrick and Lewin as a
verbatim reconstruction of the Anxiety Disorders Interview

Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow),
used to diagnose Social Phobia and GAD.

The ADIS-IV is a

clinical assessment instrument designed to be administered
as a structured interview providing detailed information

specific to a disorder's DSM-IV description and requisite
criterion.

The primary function of the ADIS-IV is to

augment the therapists' determining the nature and the

severity of an individual's presenting dysfunction.
The Social Phobia and GAD Self Report ADIS-IV is
comprised of two sections; one devoted to the assessment of

Social Phobia (SociaT Phobia ADIS-IV) the other is devoted
to the assessment of GAD (GAD ADIS-IV).
The Social Phobia ADIS-IV section is comprised of 3

Subsections termed Social Evaluation, Social Anxiety, and

Social Avoidance.

Subsectibn items are eight point Likert

type scale with descriptors labeled "hot at all,"

"moderately," and "extremely."

The section is designed to

assess Social Phobia as anxious responding in social

surroundings, higher scores denoting greater perceived
anxiety.

The Social Evaluation subsection is comprised of 3
items that assess general aspects of anxious social

perceptions as evaluative concerns (e.g. 'when you're in

social situations where others could be evaluating you or
when you meet new people, do you feel fearful, anxious, or
nervous').

The Social Anxiety subsection is comprised of 12 items
that assess the severity of anxiety as affect the individual
would experience in response to a specific social situation

(e.g., being at a party, speaking in public).
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Below a

general measure description asking; "Here are some

situations.

How anxious would you feel in each situation—

and if you found yourself making a decision about doing this
thing [sic] when anxious would you do it or avoid it?" is

positioned a restatement asking; "How anxious would you feel
if you found yourself in a situation where yoti might be:"

This restatement precedes the list of 12 situation- specific
items (e.g., being at a party, speaking in public).
Directly below each of the listed 12 Social Anxiety
item, is placed the corresponding Social Avoidance item.

Each of the 12 Social Avoidance items is preceded by a

question that asks "when anxious would you avoid this?"
This question is in reference to the described social

situation (e.g., being at a party, speaking in public).
The GAD subsection is comprised of 12 items designed to
assess worry as the principle cognitive component in GAD.

Each item targets one of 12 specific life-domain areas of

worry (e.g., being on time, fitness and health).

Each life-

domain worry area item incorporates four embedded subscales.
In the order in which presented, these embedded subscales

are labeled; GAD - Worry Frequency, GAD - Worry Breadth, GAD
- Uncontrolled Worry, and GAD - Excessive Worry.

The GAD - Worry Frequency subscale is an 8 point
numeric index assessing the number of worries the
participant experienced per week over the last six months in

the specified life-domain worry area.
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Below a written

description of the life-domain worry area (e.g., your
academic performance, your concern over minor matters/little
things)/ is a question asking; "How often you were

worried..."

Place directly to the right is a sequential

numeric index consisting of eight numbers in a horizontal

string with anchors 0 and 7, descriptors labeled "never,"
"seldom," and "all the time"; the number indicating the
corresponding equivalent number of worries.
The GAD - Worry Breadth subscale is dichotomous forcedchoice and is designed to assess the diffuse breadth of the

individual's worry content in the specified life-domain

worry area being assessed.

The GAD - Worry Breadth Subscale

is placed immediately below the GAD- Worry Frequency

measure.

To the immediate right of the subscale description

asking "Was your worry content" are two boxes located

horizontally side by side, with headings placed directly
above the boxes labeled focused on the left and wide on the

right.

Located beneath The GAD - Worry Breadth subscale, are
the GAD - Uncontrolled Worry, and GAD - Excessive Worry

subscales.

The two subscales are designed to assess the

degree to which anxious worry in the described worry life
domain is experienced as uncontrollable and excessive.

To

the immediate right of a subscale description question

asking "was the nature of your worry"

are placed two eight

point (0-7) Likert-type scales in vertical column alignment.
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The first scale is preceded by the term Uncontrolled^ the
second scale is preceded by the term Excessive.

Item

descriptors are labeled "not at all," "moderately," and
"extremely."

Higher scores denote greater perceived anxious

worry in the life domain being assessed.
Predictions

Utilizing community college norms published in the
Preliminary Professional Manual for the Test Attitude

Inventory (TAI: Spielberger, 1980), self-reported ratings of
test anxiety as measured by the Test Attitude Inventory
(TAI; Spielberger, Gonzalez, Taylor, Algaze, & Anton, 1978)
will be used to segment the participant pool into two

groups.

The 80^^^ percentile groupings of women and men will

be employed.

The upper 20% will be considered high test

anxious individuals and the lower 80% will be considered low

test anxious individuals.

All comparisons will utilize only

high test anxious individuals.

1.

High test anxious students will also be high trait

anxious as measured by the Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI
Form Y-2; Spielberger, 1983).

2.

High Test /Trait Anxious (HT/TA) individuals can be

differentiated into two groups based upon significant
differences in their mean ratings on the GAD - Excessive
Worry subscale.

Those individuals rating themselves as having
significantly higher comparative ratings on the
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GAD ^ Excessive Worry subsca1e wi11 be:termed GAD worriers

with test anxiety and those having significantly lower
comparative ratings will be termed HT/TA worriers.

3.

Prediction number three addresses qualitative and

quantitative differences in the nature of worry experienced
by GAD worriers with test anxiety and High Test / Trait
Anxious worriers.

A means comparisons between GAD worriers with test

anxiety and HT/TA worriers will reveal the following:
Aj.

gad worriers with test anxiety will rate

significantly higher than HT/TA worriers on two self-report
measures associated with GAD; the PSWQ and the ANTI.

Bj.

gad worriers with test anxiety will rate

significantly higher than HT/TA worriers on number of

domains of worry as measured by the Number of Worries
Per-Week sub-scales and Uncontrollable Worry sub-scales of
the GAD Self Report ADIS-IV.

Cj.

GAD worriers with test anxiety will rate

significantly lower than HT/TA worriers on global cognitive
coping as measured by the CTI.
4.

Prediction four addresses differences between the two

groups on measures of Social Phobia.

GAD worriers will rate significantly higher than HT/TA
worriers on measures of social phobia as measured by the
SAD, SFNE, and the social phobia scales of the Social Phobia
and GAD Self Report ADIS-IV.

RESULTS

Unlvarlate Data Screening

All analyses utilized SPSS v.8.0.

All variables were

examined for accuracy of data entry and missing values.
Missing values were assessed during composite scale
construction and were replaced with the mean value.
All assessment scales were analyzed for fit between

their distributions and the assumptions of univariate

analysis.

For all scale items, no values were identified as

significant univariate outliers (values < 3.3 SDs, ps <
.001).

The AnTI, BBDl, CESD, PSWQ, SAD, STAI-Yl, SFNE, and

the TAX were skewed in the range of 3.3 to 3.9 standard
deviations.

These scales were retained untransformed due to

the importance of preserving extreme values.
Scale Construction

A;

Scale Construction of the GAD Self Report ADIS-IV

Number of Worries & Uncontrollable Worries Subscales

Two separate principle factor extractions with oblique

rotation were performed on response items that comprised the
Number of Worries & Uncontrollable Worries subscales of the

Self Report DSM AIDS-IV for the sample of 353 participants.

Principle components extraction was used prior to principle
factors extraction to estimate number of factors, presence

of outliers, absence of multicollinearity, and factorability
of the correlation matrices.

The principle components extraction procedure of Number
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of Worries subscale (the number of worries per week

experienced in the life domain area) revealed adequate
factorability (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin-measure of sampling
adequacy — .895) and no evidence of collinearity.

With

an Qt, = .001 cutoff 9 of the 353 participants produced
scores that identified them as outliers and were deleted

from principle factors extraction.

Three factors were extracted with corresponding

Eigenvalues of 4.920> 1.013, and .924 (see Table 1).

These

three factors accounted for 57% of the item response
variance.

With a cut off of .30 for inclusion of a variable

in interpretation of a factor one variable did not load on a

factor (number of worries per week concerning

peers/friends).

Scale reliability analysis for all items in

their respective factors revealed that the deletion of item

6 (social worries) from Factor 2 increased the reliability
for this factor from alpha = .75 to alpha .78.

This

increase was not considered sufficient to warrant the item's

removal.

Thus, all retained items in their respective

factor scales were utilized.

Factor 1 (labeled Lifestyle

Worries) consisted of worries concerning academic

performance, the participant's health, the participant's
appearance, the participant's finances, the participant's
family and the participant's being on time.

Factor 2

(labeled Distracting Worries) consisted of worries
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concerning minor matters/little things, lots of details, and

the participant's social performance.

Factor 3 (labeled

Extra-Social Worries) consisted of worries concerning
others' health and worries about the community or world

affairs.

Alphas for these scales were Factor 1 =? .81,

Factor 2 = .78, and Factor 3 = .59.

The principle components extraction procedure of
Uncontrollable Worries subscale items (the extent to which

worries in the life domain areas were uncontrollable)
revealed adequate factorability (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin-measure
of sampling adequacy = .9215) and no evidence of
collinearity. With an a = .001 cutoff, 13 of the 353
participants produced scores that identified them as

outliers and were deleted from principle factors extraction.
Table 1.

Factor Loading of Three Factors: Number of

Worries Per Week Across Life Domain

Life Domain

(n = 344)

Factor Number

Academic Performance

,731

-.0582

-.173

Fitness and Health

, 688

.0682

.194

570

-.0728

.104

Finances

,501

-.0212

.0241

Family

,481

.0768

Physical Appearance
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.206

Being on Time

,419

-.293

-.0615

-.0521

-.806

.0034

Lots of Detail

0124

-.749

.6722

Social Performance

193

-.345

.143

-.162

.651

-.0133

.380

-.249

.271

Minor Matters and

Little Things

Other's Health and

-.0366

Fitness

Community and World

138

Affairs
Peers and Friends

Three factors were extracted with corresponding

Eigenvalues of 6.457, .968, and .798 (see Table 2).

These

three factors accounted for 68.5% of the item response
variance.

With a cut off of .30 for inclusion bf a variable

in interpretation of a factor, all variables loaded on a
factor.

Scale reliability analysis for all items in their

respective factors revealed that no item deletions increased

any factor's reliability.

Thus, all items were retained and

utilized in there respective factor scales.

Factor 1

(labeled External Worries) consisted of worries concerning
lots of details, minor matters/little things, the

participant's being on time, worries about the community or
world affairs, the participant's peers and friends, others'

health, and the participant's social performance.

Factor 2

(labeled Pragmatic Worries) consisted of worries concerning
the participant's finances, the participant's family, and
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the participant's academic performance.

Factor 3 (labeled

Internal-Self Wprries) cohsiste<i of

concerning the

participant•s appearance and the participant's health.
Alphas for these scales were Factor 1 = .88, Factor 2 = .80,
and Factor 3 = .88.

Table 2.

Factor Loading of Three Factors: Uncontrollable

Nature of Worry in Life Domain

(n = 340)

Tiife Domain

Factor Number

2^
Lots of Details

845

-.0036

-.0493

Minor Matters and

818

-.0709

-.103

Being on Time

751

-.0157

.0241

Community and World

589

.0260

-.0316

Little Things

Affairs

Peers and Friends

.498

248

Other's Fitness and

.436

0516

Socia1 Performance

.338

292

>208

Finances

.0897

803

-.0787

Family

>126

697

.0559

Academic Performance

.079

595

-.113

Fitness and Health

.0187

0848

-.828

Physical Appearance

.0806

0161

-.817

.0968

-.237

Health
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B:

Scale Construction of GAD Self Report. ADIS-IV

Excessive Worry Subscale

Principle components extraction was used prior to

principle factors extraction to estimate number of factors,
presence of outliers, absence of multicollinearity, and
factorabilitY of the correlation mati^ices.

With an et = ^001 cutoff 19 of the 353 participants

produced scores that identified them as outliers and were
deleted from principle factors extraction.

Investigation of the correlation matrix prior to factor
analysis revealed uniformly high levels of item

correlations.
analysis.

This was confirmed during principle factors

Only one factor was extracted due to

multicollinearity and singularity.
Subsequent scale reliability analysis of all twelve
items comprising measure 4 revealed that no deletion of

items improved scale reliability.

Thus, all twelve items

were retained to create an Excessive Worry Scale.

Alpha for

this scale was .92.

C;

Scale Construction of Social Phobia Self Report

ADIS-IV Social Anxiety and Social Avoidance Subscales

Two separate principle factor extractions with oblique

rotation were performed on response items that comprised
Social Anxiety and Social Avoidance Subscales of the Social
Phobia Self Report ADIS-IV for the sample of 353

57

participants.

Principle components extraction was used

prior to principle factors extraction to estimate number of
factors, presence of Outliers, absence of multicoHinearity,
and factorability of the correlation matrices.

The principle components extraction procedure of Social

Anxiety subscale items (perceived ahxioushess when engaging
in specific social activities) revealed no evidence of

collinearity and adequate factorability (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampiling adequacy - .905).

With an <x = .001

cutoff, 10 of the 353 participants produced scores that

identified them as outliers and were deleted from principle
factors extraction.

Three factors were extracted with corresponding

Eigenvalues of 6.215, 1.740, and .831 (see Table 3).

These

three factors accounted for 73% of the item response
variance.

With a cut off of .30 for inclusion of a variable

in interpretation of a factor, all variables loaded on a
factor.

Scale reliability analysis for all items in their

respective factors revealed that no item deletions increased

any factor's reliability.

Factor 1 (labeled Inter-Personal

Social Concerns) consisted of a perceived anxiety concerning
attending a party, speaking with unfamiliar people, speaking
with people in authority, being assertive (refusing unfair

requests), initiating a conversation and maintaining a

conversation.

Factor 2 (labeled Social Exposure Concerns)
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consisted of a perceived anxiety concerning eating in

public, using a public restroom, and writing in public/using
ATM.

Factor 3 (labeled Extra-Personal Social Concerns)

consisted of a perceived anxiety when formally speaking in
front of people and performing at meetings/classes.

Alphas

for these scales were Factor 1 = .92, Factor 2 = .80, and
Factor 3 = .86.

Table 3.

Factor Loading of Three Factors: Social Anxiety

When Engaged in a Specific Activity

Activity

(n - 343)

Factor Number

Initiating a conversation

.956

0685

-.0817

Maintaining a conversation

.906

0036

.0985

Speaking with people in
authority

.713

0157

.0241

Dating situation

.707

, 0262

-.0974

Being assertive

.659

.0597

.0968

Attending a party

.632

.105

.150

Speaking with unfamiliar

.338

292

-.208

.517

0256

people

Using an ATM

.330

Using a public restroom

-.0378

.868

.0582

Eating in public

-.0310

.721

-.0535
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Speaking formally in front

.260

.593

.0206

.0693

-.0166

of a group

Performing in a class

.842

situation

The principle components extraction procedure of Social
Avoidance subscale items (avoidance of specified social
activities) revealed no evidence of collinearity and
adequate factorability (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin-measure of
sampling adequacy = .894).

With an a = .001 cutoff, 9 of

the 353 participants produced scores that identified them as

outliers and were deleted from principile factors extraction.
Three factors were extracted with corresponding

Eigenvalues of 5.983, 1.388, and .960 (See Table 4).

These

three factors accounted for 69% of the item response
variance.

With a cut off of .30 for inclusion of a variable

in interpretation of a factor, all variables loaded on a

factor.

Scale reliability analysis for all items in their

respective factors revealed that no item deletions increased

any factor's reliability.

Factor 1 (labeled Inter-Personal

Social Avoidance) consisted of a perceived anxiety
concerning attending a party, speaking with unfamiliar

people, speaking with people in authority, being assertive
(refusing unfair requests), initiating a conversation and

maintaining a conversation.

Factor 2 (labeled Social

Exposure Avoidance) consisted of a perceived anxiety

concerning eating in public, using a public restroom, and
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writing in public/using ATM.

Factor 3 (labeled Extra-

Personal Social Avoidance) consisted of a perceived anxiety
when formally speaking in front of people and performing at

meetings/classes.

Alphas for these scales were Factor 1 =

.90, Factor 2 = .70, and Factor 3 = .89.

Table 4.

Factor Loading of Three Factors: Social Avoidance

of a Specific Activity When Feeling Anxious n = 344)

Activity

Factor Number

Maintaining a conversation

.951

-.0964

-.0594

Initiating a conversation

.877

-.0738

.0488

Being assertive

.717

.0617

-.0564

Speaking with people in
authority

.593

.154

.108

Dating

.514

.236

.102

Attending a party

.424

.103

.247

-.0301

.770

.0239

.131

.616

.0334

Using a public restroom

-.0378

.868

.0582

Speaking formally in front

-.0296

.580

-.0411

-.0607

.905

Using an ATM
Eating in public

of a group

Performing in a class

.0048

situation

Speaking with unfamiliar

.391

people
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121

.404

Testing of Hypotheses

Analyses and Classification of High Test Anxious/
Trait Anxious Individuals

To identify participants who were high test anxious

students, participants were grouped according to normed
scores for the

percentile (Women M = 53.00, Men M =

47,00) published in the Preliminary Professional Manual for
the Test Attitude Inventory (TAX: Spielberger, 1980).

Participant BO*^*^ percentile norms for this sample were Women
M = 59.00, Men M= 50.00.

Separate One-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs)

indicated that the Upper 20'^'^ percentile and Lower 80*^^
Percentile Test Anxious groups differed significantly on a

comparison of scores on the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (See Table 5).

Those individuals in the Upper

20*''' percentile rated significantly higher on both State and
Trait Anxiety as measured by the STAI Forms Y-1 (State) and

Y-2 (Trait) when compared to individuals in the Lower 80*^*^
percentile.

Participant mean scores on the STAI Y-2 for Women(M =

49.17) and for Men (M = 45.83) corresponded to the 83^'^ and

80^^ percentile respectively for college students' scores on
the STAI Y-2 published in the Manual for the State-Trait

Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983).
As a result, those participants rating in the upper

20*''' percentile of the TAX (n = 96) were selected as
e2

representative of a study population with high test and high
trait anxiety and are referred to as High Test / Trait
Anxious (HT/TA).

Only HT/TA participants' scores oh

assessment instruments of interest were utilized in

subsequent analyses.

Table 5.

Differences in Mean Ratings of the Test Attitude

Inventory (TAX) tipper 20*^^ Percentile Group
(n = 96) Compared to the Lower

Percentile Group

(n = 257): STAI Forms Y-1 (State) and Y-2 (Trait).

TAX Group

Lower 8Q"' %
Measure df(I f 351^

M

SO

Upper 20*'''%

F

Sig

M

SD

STAX Y-1 (State)

32.91

.001

33.40

11.86

41.68

12.61

STAX Y-2 (Trait)

58.22

.001

38.42

10.42

48.02

10.76

Classification of GAD and HT/TA Worriers
As an exploratory procedure, Hierarchical Cluster

Analysis with Wards method of classification was employed to

investigate the grouping of scores on the Excessive Worry
Subscale developed from the GAD section of the DSM ADXS-XV

Self-Report.

An inspection of the dendogram produced by

this procedure revealed that 2 groups could be distinguished
based upon participants' self report of excessive worry.
Following the exploratory Hierarchical Cluster
analysis, a K-Means Cluster was utilized to create a final

63

classification of participants into 2 groups based upon

their total expressive worry scores.

Missing data for 2 of

the 96 cases were replaced with mean scores.

Convergence of

participant ratings on the Excessive Worry Scale used to
establish Cluster Centers was achieved in 2 iterations with

the Distance between Final Cluster Centers

= 28.38 (Cluster

1 Center = 20.22; Cluster 2 Center = 48.59).

A One-way

Analysis of Variance of the group means suggested that
Cluster Centers did differ significantly, F (1,94) = 194.74,

p < .001.

Cluster 1 was labeled individuals with High Test/

Trait Anxiety (HT/TA) worry (n =46).

Cluster 2 was labeled

with GAD Worry (n = 50).
A direct Discriminant Function Analysis was performed

using the entire 12 excessive worry items of the DSM ADIS-IV
GAD section as predictors for the High and Low GAD Worry

groups.

The discriminant function grouped 49 (98%)of the 50

individuals into the category previously determined by KMeans Cluster Analysis as HT/TA Worry and all 46 cases

(100%) into the previously determined category GAD Worry
based upon their scores of the 12 excessive worry items.
Overall, the discriminant function classified 95 of the 96

cases (99%) into the groUps previously established by the KMeans Cluster Procedure.

Differences in

DSM - IV Worry Domains, Qualitative

Worry, and CTI Global Coping

To assess differences between the GAD and HT/TA worrier

64

groups in quantitative and qualitative aspects of worry One
way Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were performed (see Table
6)•

To investigate differences in the number and breadth of

GAD worry-domain, comparisons were made between GAD and

HT/TA worriers on the ANTI, and Routine, Distracting and
Extra-Social Factors of the GAD ADIS-IV Self Report Number
of Worries Subscale.

To investigate differences in the qualitative aspects
of GAD worry, comparisons were made between GAD and HT/TA

worriers on PSWQ and the Extra-Self, Privacy, and Intra-Self
Factors of the GAD ADIS-IV Self Report Uncontrollable Nature
of Worry Subscale.

To investigate differences in global coping with
stress, comparisons were made between GAD and HT/TA worriers
on the CTI Global Coping.
Table 6 indicates that all differences on assessment

measures of GAD breadth of worry domains and GAD worry were

significantly higher for those in the GAD Worry group
compared to those in the HT/TA Worry group.
However, on the CTI measure of global cognitive coping,

those in the GAD Worry group rated significantly lower than
the HT/TA Worry Group.
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Table 6.

Differences Between GAD Worriers and High Test/

Trait Anxious Worriers on Mean Ratings of the GAD DSM ADIS 

IV SieIf Report Life Domain Number of Wprries and '
Uncontrollable Worry Subscale Factors, AnTI, PSWQ, and the

CTI Global Coping Scale, (df, 1,94)
' Worry Group '
Numbers of Worry
Subscale Factor
Routine

Extra-Social

HT/TA
F

Sia

M

GAD

Gd

M

SD

32.18

.001

.231

4.07

1.15

5.28

.89

48.32

.001

.329

2.82

1.45

4.72

1.18

12.80

.001

.108

2.83

1.23

3.79

1.36

M

sn

Uncontrollable Worry
Subscale Factor

F

h

M

SD

Extra-Self

87.99

.001

.499

1.61

1.06

3.71

1.12

Pragmatic

51.22

.001

.352

2.53

1.50

4.59

1.27

Intra-Self

56.85

.001

.352

1.97

1.53

4.35

1.53

AnTI

26.30

.001

.218

64.15

16.29

48.98

12.18

PSWQ

25.37

.001

.214

58.41

10.14

47.31

11.18

CTI-GLOBAL

23.16

.001

.191

55.52

9.28

46.46

8.97

Differences in DSM - IV Social Phobia and Fear of
Negative Social Evaluation

To assess differences in anxious social responding
between the GAD and HT/TA worrier groups. One-way Analyses
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of Variance (ANOVAs) were performed (see Table 7).

Table 7.

Differences in Mean Ratings Between GAD Worriers

and High Test / Trait Anxious Worriers; Social Phobia DSM
ADIS - IV Self Report Social Evaluative Items, Social
Anxiety, and Avoidance Concerns Subscales; BFNE, and SADS.
(df 1,94)

Worry
HT/TA

Social Evaluation

Evaluation Item

Social

Group

F

Sia

n2

GAD

M

SD

M

SD

6.70

.011

.070

4.35

2.17

5.49

2.03

5.76

.018

.060

4.55

2.11

5.53

1.78

5.04

.027

.055

5.50

2.03

6.36

1.54

Evaluation
Social

Interaction
Trait Social
Evaluation

Social Anxiety
Subscale Factor

Inter-Personal

Privacy
Extra-Personal

F

Siq

M

SD

M

SD

21.14

.001

.170

3.03

1.58

4.50

1.53

7.32

.007

.073

1.53

1.83

2.62

1.98

31.59

.001

.262

2.50

1.53

4.18

1.37

Social Avoidance
Subscale Factor

Inter-Personal

F

Sia

M

SD

M

SD

13.91

.001

.125

2.23

1.70

3.47

1.51

Privacy

9.60

.003

.091

1.13

1.57

2.22

.82

Extra-Personal

8.22

.005

.085

2.68

2.28

3.95

1.99
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BFNE

14.42

.001

.130

33.78

7.65

40.20

8.22

SAD

10.21

.002

.105

9.02

7.23

14.49

8.81

To reveal underlying differences in Social Phobia's
Anxiety component, comparisons were made between Gad and

HT/TA worriers on ratings of the Inter-Personal, Privacy,
and Extra-Personal Factors of the GAD ADIS-IV Self Report
Social Anxiety Subscale.

To investigate differences in Social Phobia Avoidance,

comparisons were made between Gad and HT/TA worriers on
ratings of the Inter-Personal, Privacy, and Extra-Personal
Factors of the GAD ADIS-IV Self Report Social Avoidance
Subscale, and the Fear of Negative Social Evaluation Brief
Form.

As illustrated by Table 7, all differences on the

Social Phobia Anxiety Factors and Social Phobia Avoidance
Factors were significantly higher for GAD worriers in
comparison to HT/TA worriers.

Ratings on the Brief Fear of Negative Social Evaluation
revealed that GAD worriers rated significantly higher on

Fear of Negative Social Evaluations compared to HT/TA
worriers.
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DISCUSSION

This study's findings are in accord with the

theoretical position that worry as the cognitive component

of anxiety may represent an endogenous negative processing
bias for evaluation as threat.

It was assumed that a

stressful environment would contribute to increased levels

of worry and so, facilitate self-report of that worryi

On

the basis of this assumption, a population of community
college students facing a regularly scheduled exam was
utilized.

These students were given the Test Attitude

Inventory (TAI) to assess their current levels of test

anxiety.

Normed 80^^ percentile scores of a similar

population from the published manual of TAI were employed to
segment this study's participants into low test anxious and

high test anxious groups.

A means test comparing the high

and low test anxious groups revealed that high test anxious

participants were rating significantly higher on the StateTrait Anxiety Inventory Forms Y-1 and Y-2 (measuring state
and trait anxiety respectively).

Thus, in a comparison

between the two groups, the high test anxious group reported

experiencing significantly greater levels of state-dependent
anxiety as well as greater levels of overall anxiety.

These

reported higher levels among high test anxious participants
suggests that predictions concerning differences in the

quality and quantity of these individuals' worries should be

useful in identifying the degree to which that worry is
69

similar or dissimilar to anxiety disorder.
In functioning trait-anxious populations, Worry

elements correlated with anxiety disorder do not necessarily
deprive individuals of the ability to perform their day-to
day routines.

Research investigating PET suggests that

trait anxious individuals dedicate additional processing
resources to the maintenance of, rather than the increased

efficiency, of performance tasks.

Some high test / trait

anxious individuals facing a threatening evaluation task
could represent increased risk of dysfunction due to their

anxiety.

This vulnerability should appear as a similarity

between their worry numbers and content and the worry
numbers and content reported by individuals diagnosed with
GAD.

Worry as the cognitive component of anxiety is the
central element at work in test anxiety rather than the

physiological or behavioral (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995).

The

narrow and specific nature of the worry incapacitates the

individual's ability to perform at adequate levels on a
specific cognitive task—participating in a standardized

evaluation of what they have learned.

As in test anxiety,

the cognitive component of anxiety in GAD outweighs the

physical or behavioral components—GAD is a cognitive

processing disorder.

Unlike test anxiety, in GAD diagnoses

undifferentiated excessive worry is a defining
characteristic of individuals who are GAD-positive.
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Thus, HT/TA individuals may be differentiated as GAD or

only High Test / Trait Anxious by self-reported levels of

excessive worry (as the cognitive component of their

anxiety).

This prediction stems from two sources.

First,

Eysenck's (1992) theoretical perspective that stressed high

trait anxious individuals possess a negatively biased
endogenous threat processing of stimuli, representative of a

manifest vulnerability to GAD.

Second, research findings

indicate that worry, as the cognitive element in anxiety, is
a shared central component at work in both test anxiety and

GAD.

This shared component of worry may differ on

measurable gualitative and quantitative dimensions

(Spielberger & Vagg, 1995).
Within the Diathesis Stress model of anxiety, excessive
worry in high trait anxious individuals is a central element

related to Social Phobia, GAD, and vulnerability to both GAD

and Social Phobia.

Research on the nature of anxiety has

shown excessive worry to be significantly related to high
levels of endogenous biased threat processing in high trait

anxious individuals (Crake, Rapee, Jackel, & Barlow, 1989;
Schwarzer, 1996).

Excessive worry is a DSM-IV criterion for establishing
clinical levels of GAD present among high trait anxious
individuals.

This criterion was measured in the current

study by the GAD DSM ADIS-IV Self-report Excessive Worry
Subscale.

Participant ratings oh this subscale provided a
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basis for the classification of two groups~GAD worriers and
HT/TA worriers.
The anticipated utility of measuring a DSM-IV GAD

diagnostic criterion for classification purposes is to place
high test anxious trait anxious individuals on a continuum.

At one end would be the HT/TA individual whose endogenous
negative processing-bias of evaluation as threat did not
represent a manifest vulnerability to GAD.

At the other end

would be those whose processing was more closely aligned
with a component residing with clinical GAD populations.

This measure preserved a fundamental element of GAD shared,

in varying degrees, that could form a bridge between those
who are only high test / trait anxious and those who may be
vulnerable to GAD.

Preserving the link between GAD and test

anxiety among the groups maintained a direct relationship
between the exploration of significant differences between

qualitative and quantitative worry dimensions and the
theoretical context of HT and PET.

Interestingly, the Excessive Worry Scale emerged as a
homogeneous scale due to high inter-item correlations.

The

high correlations prevented a Factor Analysis of 12 items
that eventually were used to comprise the scale.

It must be

noted that the development of the Excessive Worry Scale in

this final homogeneous configuration was unanticipated and
serendipitous.

Whether the scale is empirically and

psychometrically valid in its measurement of excessive worry
12

per-se is not addressed here.

It is the position of this

researcher that the Excessive Worry Scale was legitimately

employed due to this study's a-priori integration of the DSM
ADIS-IV as a measure of GAD worry.

Differentiating HT/TA individuals by their ratings on
the Excessive Worry Subscale was a necessary first-step in
order to determine important qualitative and quantitative
dimensions-of-worry differences in the subsequent groups.
The scales inclusion in subsequent analyses reflects the

assertion that excessive worry is a central diagnostic
element capable of differentiating GAD-like from non GAD-

like groups of participants on the basis of their worry.
Furthermore the scale's homogeneity and high reliability

suggests that ratings correspond to the participant's
experience of excessive worry in general.

Subscale items

asked respondents to indicate their level of excessive worry

in the 12 life domains listed in the GAD DSM ADIS-IV.

Thus,

high ratings on those items reliably indicate the degree to
which excessive worry dominates GAD responding in various
performance arenas.

A Cluster Analysis was used to classify participants by

empirically establishing the similarity in groupings of
scores on the GAD Excessive Worry scale.

These groupings

were then validated through Discriminant Function Analysis
correctly classifying 99% of the individuals into their

previously established groups.

The two groupings were

termed GAD worriers and HT/TA worriers.

It was jiredicted that GAD worriers would rate higher on
reliable measures of GAD and GAD worry when compared to

HT/TA worriers.

In support of the predictions, those with

GAD worry scored significantly higher when compared to HT/TA
worriers on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire, the Anxious
Thoughts Inventory, all three factors of the Life Domain
Number of Worries subscale and all three factors of the Life

Domain Uncontrollable Worry subscale.

These findings

support the hypothesis that a possible relationship exists
between some trait anxious individuals and a manifest

vulnerability to GAD due to stressed responding increasing
negatively biased threat processing.
To illustrate, consider the PSWQ; a measure used to

discriminate the degree of worried thought in diagnosed GAD

populations (Borkovec, T. D., 1994; Wells, A., 1994a).

In

addition, the Penn State Worry Group has employed the PSWQ
to screen unselected populations for incidence of GAD

(Borkovec, T.D., Shadick, R., & Hopkins, M., 1991).

The GAD

worry group's comparatively higher ratings on this measure

provide evidence that their worry content (qualitative
content) more closely resembles that of GAD diagnosed

i

individuals and more closely resembles the worry of
individuals with undiagnosed GAD in unselected populations
relative to those individuals who are High Test / Trait
Anxious.

Furthermore, those classified as GAD worriers rated
significantly higher compared to those individuals

classified as HT/TA on levels of uncontrollable worry~a
qualitative GAD-worry dimension. On average. The GAD worry
individual reported comparatively greater difficulty

controlling worries on established DSM-IV GAD measures.

The

GAD worry group reported sighificantly greater difficulty
controlling worries that were external in nature, concerned

with practical matters, and worries concerning internal

self-related issues (e.g., worries concerning lots of
details, the community or world affairs, finances and
academic performance, and personal appearance).

This

additional evidence supports the conclusion that qualitative
aspects of a stressed, high trait anxious individual•s worry
may represent a relative increase in vulnerability to GAD.
The GAD worry group also reported quantitative

differences in worry compared to the HT/TA group.

On

average, individuals in the GAD worry group reported

comparatively higher levels of worry in domains measured by
the AnTI.

The GAD worry individuals also reported

significantly more worries per week in life areas related to

their lifestyle, day-to-day routine, and the larger social
world.

These findings suggest that compared to high trait

anxious individuals with focused concerns over testing, GAD
worriers have a considerably greater number and a wider
range of anxious ruminative thoughts.
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Lastly, the relationship between cognitive coping and
manifest vulnerability to GAD in stressed high trait anxipus

individuals was investigated.

The exploratory investigation

of cognitive coping as a mitigating factor for the manifest
vulnerability to GAD centered on the prediction that GAD
worriers would score significantly lower on Epstein•s
Constructive Thinking Inventory when compared to those

individuals classified as having test anxiety concomitant
with high trait anxiety.

This prediction originates with

research that concludes that Constructive Thinking is a
measurable component of global cognitive coping with stress

(Epstein, S. & Katz, L., 1992; Epstein, S., & Meier, P.,
1989).

Individuals may experience stress but some will

utilize cognitive processes to mitigate a negative impact of
stress on performance tasks by implementing increased
problem solving without increased stress.

It is the

perspective of this study that Constructive Thinking may

also signify the individual's ability to moderate the impact
of stress on thought and so moderate the impact of stress on
worry.

Thus, it was predicted that individuals who rated high
on instruments that measured the GAD quantitative and
qualitative aspects of worry would rate comparatively low on
Epstein's Constructive Thinking Inventory (CTI) as a measure
of global cognitive coping.

In support of this prediction,

cognitive coping in GAD worriers as measured by mean scores

on the Global Coping CTI was significantly lower when
compared with HT/TA individuals.

This finding is

interpreted as suggesting the possibility exists that

increased cognitive coping as measured by the CTI is a
successful compensatory learned response to stress within

the framework of PET.

GAD worriers may not learn how to use

additional processing to mitigate stress and so reduce their
GAD worry because they are worried about testing and

everything else. By comparison, increased problem solving
processing in HT/TA individuals may be targeted on more
narrow concerns relatively focused on testing.

This

comparative narrowing of focus may increase the cognitive
"pay-off" when additional attentional resources are

dedicated to learning how to learn a strategy allowing HT/TA
students to cope with evaluation.

Eysenck (1992) has suggested that manifest

vulnerability to GAD in high dispositionally trait anxious
individuals may be related to dysfunctional threat
responding during social interaction.

Threat in these

situations is the misinterpretation of ambiguous social
stimuli as social evaluative threat concomitant with

increased anxiety (in thj-s case measured by GAD worry) and
decreased performance levels.

The misinterpretation of

social interaction as evaluative threat is facilitated and

maintained by the high trait anxious individuals' negative
cognitive threat-processing bias.
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In order to ascertain whether fear of negative social

evaluation and social phobia-like responding are implicated
in manifest vulnerability to GAD, comparative differences
between HT/TA worriers and GAD worriers on measures of

social phobia and fear of negative social evaluation were

investigated.

It was hypothesized that those with a GAD

worry component would score significantly higher on these
measures when compared to HT/TA individuals.

The findings supported the hypotheses.

GAD worriers

scored significantly higher on the BFNE, the SAD, the Social

Evaluation Items of the Social Phobia ADIS-IV, and the
Social Anxiety and Social Avoidance subscales of the Social
Phobia ADIS-IV.

Those individuals who were broad and diffuse in their

excessive worry, who did not problem solve without

increasing their stress, also were significantly impacted by
evaluative social concerns as well as evaluative testing
concerns compared with those individuals whose excessive

worry was significantly more constrained and focused on

testing.

GAD worriers responded significantly higher on

comparative ratings of questions that asked them whether

they felt ill-at-ease in social situations, were concerned
with other's forming unfavorable impressions, were affected
by someone's judging them, and the extent to which they were
fearful in " ... social situations where others could be

evaluating you ..."
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When rating their anxious feelings in situations that
required their active involvement, GAD like worriers
responded significantly higher compared to HT/TA
individuals.

On average, the GAD worriers rated higher than

HT/TA worriers on Inter-Personal Social Concerns (attending

a party, speaking with unfamiliar people, speaking with

people in authority, being assertive (refusing unfair
requests), initiating a conversation and maintaining a
conversation), Social Exposure Concerns (eating in public,
using a public restroom, and writing in public/using ATM),

and Extra-Personal Social Concerns (formally speaking in

front of people and performing at meetings/classes).

GAD

like worriers responded significantly higher compared to

HT/TA individuals when rating their affiliated behavioral
avoidance in these situation due to their anxious feelings.
Taken together these data suggest that characteristics

present in high dispositionally trait anxious individuals
are also present in high test anxious community college
students.

When excessive worry is used to differentiate

between groups of high test anxious / trait anxious
students, a corresponding element related to GAD worry as

threat processing and lowered global ability to cope with
stress emerges.

This assertion is made more plausible given

the size of the corresponding values of eta squared of the
means tests of differences between groups on those measures

utilized in determining these differences.
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There is also

evidence that the fear of negative social evaluation is

releivant to the investigation of manifest vulnerability to
GAD.

Individuals with GAD worry showed a comparative greater
number of concerns in the arena of Social Phobia and social

evaluation fear.

A primary component of test anxiety is

fear of negative evaluation.

Test anxious students see

testing as an evaluative process whose outcome may mean

negative social performance judgments.

However, compared to

the GAD worry group, HT/TA individuals did not augment their
concern over testing with increased worry about social

avoidance or social-phobic anxious thoughts.

It may be that

these individuals' focus on learning provides a central
theme with which to maintain stability over performance.
Thus a poor test is only as threatening as the grade it
represents, rather than representing one more areas of poor

performance in the student's social life.
This study began by postulating that for some high
trait anxious individuals the structure provided by the
academic environment may serve as a prophylactic for the

manifest vulnerability to GAD.

A self report measure of

excessive worry was employed to investigate qualitative and
quantitative dimensions of anxious ruminative thoughts.
Findings concerning these differences were in accord with
the study's predictions stemming from Eysenck's

Hypervigilance and Processing Efficiency Theory.

80

The

results are interpreted to suggest that the scope of worry
in high test f trait anxious individuals may correspond to a
comparative degree of dysfunction in cognitive and social

A final and exploratory effort of this investigation
was to hypothesize that comparative ratings on Constructive

Thinking (Epstein & Meier, 1989) would be higher in those
individuals whose worry was more focused and less broad—

whose worry was constrained in areas directly related to
GAD, Fear of Negative Social Evaluation, and Social Phobia.

The findings supported the hypothesis.

This support led to

a preliminary interpretation that the global ability to
solve problems without increasing stress may be related to
increased competency during stressful social interaction and
lower vulnerability to GAD.

Importantly, Eysenck (1992) has observed that worry

concerning social performance dominates anxious thoughts in

clinical GAD populations.

He suggests that worry concerning

social performance may be an unexplored element in a stress-

diathesis model of manifest vulnerability to GAD.

Eysenck

states that GAD may result from an endogenous negative

processing bias of ambiguous social information as threat.
HT/TA individuals who are capable of solving problems

without increasing stress would exhibit adequate responding
without requiring additional resources dedicated to worry.
In contrast, GAD worriers ratings on social phobia and

social avoidance factors and social evaluative concerns are

significantly higher.

Several conclusions can be derived

from this interpretation.

First, the higher rating of Constructive Thinking among
HT/TA individuals may be indicative of lower levels of

manifest vulnerability to GAD.

Second, the relatively

focused worry across fewer GAD related life-domains may

indicate higher levels of social and cognitive performance
in community college students.

Third, this study provides

preliminary and gualified evidence for suggesting that for
some high trait anxious individuals, the academic
environment may be related to the moderation of a manifest
vulnerability to GAD.

This interpretation is necessarily limited; no data
regarding participant cognitive or social functioning were
collected and analyzed (e.g., GPA, attendance, comprehension

ability).

As a result, a relationship between levels of GAD

worry and established academic criterion for adequate

cognitive or social responding can not be directly assessed.
However, Gad-like worry has been shown to be highly
correlated and causally implicated in increased distraction,

forgetfulness, irritability, and emotional discomfort (for

discussion see Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).
Thus the assumption that a relationship between observed

differences in test anxious students' qualitative and
quantitative GAD worry elements and adequate cognitive and
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social performance is justified though not directly

supported by empirical evidence gathered in this study.
Further research is needed to explore a possible
correspondence between levels of cognitive and social

functioning in stressed HT/TA individuals, worry, learning,
and performance.

A relationship may exist between the structured

academic environment and the mitigation of worry, and

between adequate scholastic functioning and coping with
stress as measured by the CTI.

Interpretation of the

findings concerning relationships of this nature are
necessarily qualified by a lack of direct evidence.

No

attempt to directly assess the impact of the academic

environment upon coping with stress and subsequent

moderation of GAD worry was made.

However, this study's

results remain relevant to this issue.

The results of this study support an observation that
relationships between the structure inherent in academia and

a moderating factor in the manifest vulnerability to GAD are
possible to explore.

It can be concluded that self-report

instruments measuring changes in scholastic aptitude along

with academic social and cognitive involvement may correlate
with changes in qualitative and quantitative aspects of
worry.

The development of these instruments Would further

research in the area of test anxiety and worry.

Differences

between the HT/TA and GAD worried student groups on the CTI
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do suggest that, on average, problem solving without

increasihg stress is a factor related to wotry in these
populations.

Thus, factprs increasing Constructive Thinking

as cognitive problem solving are implicated in the

mitigation of GAD worry.

From this standp6int it is

reasonable to argue that the scholastic environment may

provide an unambiguous structure for learning problem
solving without increased levels of stress, relative to the

larger social world.

This suggests that future research is

required concerning the scholastic environment and that

environment's contribution to increased coping and possible
decreased manifest vulnerability to GAD worry.

In conclusion, this study was successful in its attempt
to reveal underlying dimensions of worry and the

relationship between those dimensions and cognitive coping

with stress.

Future research may find it useful to develop

models that investigate Epstein's Constructive Thinking as a
moderator of GAD worry.

Furthermore, the findings suggest

that theory and research focused on GAD and Social Phobia

are related to research exploring test anxious / trait

anxious community college students ability to adequately
cope with stress.

Lastly, there are elements related to

social evaluation and the inference of threat concerning

evaluation common to GAD, Social Phobia, and Test Anxiety.
This provides preliminary evidence for Eysenck's (1992)
statement that social interaction may represent increased

worry and stress, resulting in the increased likelihood of

vulnerability to GAD.

The support gathered for these

hypotheses is qualified and provisional.

However, it

appears that this study does provide initial direction for

further exploration of factors that may have a potential to
mitigate both test anxiety and GAD.
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